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Grand jury proceedings are shrouded in secrecy. No judge presides over them, 
no reporter annotates them, and when they have concluded, no juror may speak 
about them. While secrecy serves many important functions for the grand jury, its 
veil may be lifted under certain circumstances. Grand jury records may be released 
if they fall under a disclosure exception laid out in Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 6(e). While some courts limit release to the exceptions laid out in the Rule, oth-
ers look to an alternative source of authority. 
Several courts of appeals have held that district court judges may exercise in-
herent supervisory power in authorizing the release of grand jury records. Judges 
may consider the public interest in disclosure, compare it to the institutional interest 
in secrecy, and decide for themselves. Other circuits find no such power. 
The circuits have reached an impasse on the text of the Rule alone, with each 
side offering compelling but incomplete justifications for their interpretation. This 
Comment provides an alternative path forward. By examining the history of the 
grand jury and the relationship between the Federal Rules and common law super-
visory power, this Comment argues that district court judges lack inherent supervi-
sory power over the grand jury to order disclosure. Courts that follow the exhaustive 
position—that Rule 6(e)(3) limits the exceptions when a court may authorize disclo-
sure—better align with the understanding of the grand jury as an independent body. 
Conscious of this historical positioning, this Comment returns to both influential 
and overlooked Supreme Court precedent and offers a more contextually grounded 
interpretation of each. Judges have discretion to act within the bounds of Rule 6(e), 
not outside of it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Stuart McKeever wants to know what happened in an infa-
mous grand jury room over sixty years ago. A Columbia Univer-
sity professor named Jesús de Galíndez Suárez had disappeared 
in 1956.1 Suárez, a sharp critic of Dominican dictator Rafael Tru-
jillo, was presumed to have been kidnapped and murdered by the 
Trujillo regime.2 After an FBI agent was suspected in the crime 
and questioned before a grand jury, the case went cold.3 McKeever 
had been writing about Suárez’s disappearance for forty years, 
and he believed that the agent’s sealed grand jury records held 
the key to the decades-old mystery.4 All the court had to do was 
authorize their release. 
But McKeever’s case was felled by a humble procedural rule, 
one that the court explained provided an exhaustive list of 
 
 1 McKeever v Barr, 920 F3d 842, 843 (DC Cir 2019), cert denied, 140 S Ct 597 (2020). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id at 843–44 (noting that the grand jury did not find probable cause to indict). 
 4 See id at 843. 
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situations in which a judge could authorize disclosure of grand 
jury materials. While McKeever acknowledged that disclosure on 
the grounds of historical significance fell outside the scope of Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) (the “Rule”), he argued that 
a district court judge could exercise supervisory power to disclose 
grand jury proceedings.5 
The DC Circuit held that the district court had no such 
power.6 This decision broke with the Second, Seventh, and Elev-
enth Circuits at the time, which had each held that judges have 
some inherent power to act outside the Rule’s exceptions.7 I will 
refer to that as the “permissive” approach. The DC Circuit re-
marked that “we simply cannot agree” with the Seventh Circuit’s 
position, thereby acknowledging its creation of a circuit split.8 I 
will refer to the DC Circuit’s interpretation as the “exhaustive” 
approach. McKeever v Barr9 was the first decision to squarely con-
front the permissive approach and to decidedly reject it. 
The circuits have reached an impasse. The recent cases re-
veal an interpretative divide over whether courts are endowed 
with inherent power to act outside of the Federal Rules. The Sev-
enth, Eleventh, and DC Circuits have each chosen to focus on the 
language of Rule 6(e) and found answers within the confines of 
the text. The Seventh Circuit determined that the Rule is clearly 
intended to be permissive, the DC Circuit confidently declared the 
opposite, and the Eleventh Circuit recently switched from the per-
missive to the exhaustive approach. 
Beyond differing interpretations of a procedural rule, the 
split reveals a division in the understanding of the institutional 
relationship between federal courts and the grand jury: To what 
extent do judges have judicial authority over grand jury 
 
 5 See McKeever, 920 F3d at 845. 
 6 Id at 850. 
 7 After McKeever was handed down in April 2019, the Eleventh Circuit voted to re-
hear Pitch v United States, 915 F3d 704 (11th Cir 2019) (Pitch I), en banc in June of that 
year. Pitch v United States, 925 F3d 1224, 1224–25 (11th Cir 2019). On March 27, 2020, 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed its prior panel decision and held that district court judges 
do not have inherent power to disclose outside the exceptions in Rule 6(e), overturning its 
influential precedent in In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F2d 
1261 (11th Cir 1984) (Hastings), and siding with the DC Circuit. Pitch v United States, 
953 F3d 1226, 1241 (11th Cir 2020) (en banc) (Pitch II). 
 8 McKeever, 920 F3d at 850. Whether the DC Circuit created a new split or shed 
light on an existing one is addressed in Part II.E.1. Because the latest decisions under the 
permissive approach viewed their position to be unanimous, it seems appropriate to refer 
to McKeever as creating a new split. 
 9 920 F3d 842, 843 (DC Cir 2019). 
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proceedings? I aim to resolve the circuit split by first understand-
ing the relationship of the grand jury to the judiciary. Once estab-
lished, I determine whether supervisory power survived the codi-
fication of the Federal Rules. Finally, I reexamine Supreme Court 
precedent to question the view that supervisory power extends 
over the grand jury. 
I argue that district court judges lack inherent supervisory 
power to order disclosure of grand jury materials. The exhaustive 
position—that Rule 6(e)(3) is exhaustive in its exceptions as to 
when a court may authorize disclosure—has a solid basis in the 
original understanding of the grand jury as an independent body. 
Further, Congress abrogated any supervisory power over the 
grand jury that existed at common law by codifying Rule 6(e). 
This interpretation aligns with a contextualized reading of the 
oft-cited Supreme Court decisions on this matter. 
The Supreme Court denied McKeever’s petition for writ of 
certiorari on January 21, 2020.10 In denying review, the Court has 
left the issue to percolate among the circuits. Justice Stephen 
Breyer, in a statement respecting the denial of certiorari, issued 
a call to action: “Whether district courts retain authority to re-
lease grand jury material outside those situations specifically 
enumerated in the Rules, or in situations like this, is an im-
portant question. It is one I think the [Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Rules (Rules Committee)] both can and should revisit.”11 
Settling this question will provide clarity to four key stake-
holders: the remaining circuits, the Rules Committee, the govern-
ment, and members of the public seeking these records. The ma-
jority of circuits, yet to weigh in on the issue, must look beyond 
the opposing textual analyses of the circuit split. This Comment 
provides a novel solution to these stakeholders. By accepting the 
textual ambiguity that courts thus far have refused to 
acknowledge, this Comment looks instead for clues in the history 
of the grand jury and overlooked Court precedent. 
This Comment is composed of three parts. Part I provides a 
background on the grand jury, Rule 6(e), and supervisory power. 
Part II describes the circuit split, tracing the expansion of the 
judge-made supervisory-power exception and culminating in the 
current divide between the Second and Seventh Circuits on one 
side and the Eleventh and DC Circuits on the other. Part III 
 
 10 McKeever v Barr, 140 S Ct 597 (2020). 
 11 Id at 598 (Breyer respecting denial of certiorari). 
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argues that Rule 6(e) should be read exhaustively, as any super-
visory power that courts may have had over the grand jury was 
accounted for in the exceptions provided within the Rule. Recent 
decisions justify departure from the Rule by explaining that ac-
cess to these documents serves the press and the public. If disclo-
sures outside the current exceptions promote the public interest, 
the courts and the public should push Congress to amend the 
Rule. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Background on the grand jury and the possible sources of au-
thority over it will help clarify whether Rule 6(e)’s exceptions are 
exhaustive or permissive. I first describe the role of the grand jury 
and how the grand jury differs from the trial jury. I then introduce 
Rule 6(e), the statutory authority for when grand jury proceed-
ings may be disclosed. Finally, I explain the idea of supervisory 
power and its relationship to the Federal Rules. 
A. The Grand Jury 
A grand jury must determine whether to initiate judicial pro-
ceedings before any serious federal crime is brought to trial.12 
From an initial pool of randomly selected citizens, twenty-three 
are selected to serve on the jury for a period not to exceed eighteen 
months.13 A district court judge administers an oath, under which 
jurors swear that they will perform their investigations dili-
gently, they will indict truthfully, and they will not disclose any-
thing they learn.14 After administering the oath, the judge retires, 
her formal involvement with the process complete.15 Then, the 
prosecutor takes over.16 
Once proceedings have begun, the grand jury reviews the 
case and weighs the evidence that the prosecutor presents.17 
 
 12 See US Const Amend V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”). 
 13 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 
80 Cornell L Rev 260, 265 (1995). 
 14 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Handbook for Federal 
Grand Jurors *3–6, archived at https://perma.cc/YS32-S5WM. 
 15 Leipold, 80 Cornell L Rev at 265 (cited in note 13). 
 16 See id at 266. See also United States v Williams, 504 US 36, 47 (1992) (“Judges’ 
direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been confined to . . . 
calling the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office.”). 
 17 See Leipold, 80 Cornell L Rev at 266 (cited in note 13). 
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When a federal prosecutor presents a case before the grand jury, 
she is both the jury’s legal advisor and the party seeking an in-
dictment.18 The prosecutor informs the jurors of the charges, de-
cides what evidence to present, and answers juror questions on 
the law.19 By representing the federal government, the prosecutor 
has an obligation “to execute the laws in an impartial and just 
manner.”20 She ought to advise the grand jury of the evidence 
without directing the jurors to indict.21 
Throughout the course of the proceedings, grand jurors may 
ask questions of the witnesses and the prosecutor.22 Rather than 
evaluating guilt or innocence, the grand jurors must determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has 
committed a crime.23 If at least twelve jurors agree that there is 
probable cause, they will return a “true bill.”24 A true bill consti-
tutes the basis of an indictment, sparking a criminal case and 
framing the charges that will be brought against the defendant.25 
If the grand jury is not convinced of probable cause, the case can-
not move forward.26 
Endowed with significant investigative powers, grand jurors 
must decide what comes next for the accused. Jurors are allowed 
to consider, for example, evidence that was obtained illegally, 
hearsay, and their preexisting knowledge of the crime.27 Prosecu-
tors are not required to present the evidence in a neutral manner, 
meaning that exculpatory evidence does not need to be disclosed.28 
The grand jury is thus distinct from the trial jury in several 
important respects. While the trial jury clearly falls under the judi-
cial branch, the grand jury is better understood as a “quasi-political 
 
 18 See Susan M. Schiappa, Preserving the Autonomy and Function of the Grand Jury: 
United States v. Williams, 43 Cath U L Rev 311, 332–33 (1993). 
 19 See id. 
 20 Id at 332, citing Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States 
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sover-
eignty whose obligation [is] to govern impartially.”). 
 21 Schiappa, 43 Cath U L Rev at 332 (cited in note 18). 
 22 See Leipold, 80 Cornell L Rev at 266 (cited in note 13). 
 23 See id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Func-
tion of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 Georgetown L J 1265, 1276, 1280 (2006). 
 26 See Leipold, 80 Cornell L Rev at 266 (cited in note 13). 
 27 Id at 267. 
 28 Id. See also McKethan v United States, 439 US 936, 938 (1978) (Stewart dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (“In grand jury proceedings, the ordinary rules of evidence do not 
apply. Leading questions and multiple hearsay are permitted and common.”). 
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institution.”29 Trial juries are seen as “officers of the court[ ]” who 
follow the instructions of the presiding judge and aim to reach an 
outcome consistent with the law.30 It is the job of the judiciary, the 
trial jury included, to interpret and apply the law as written.31 In 
contrast, grand jurors have “independent authority” to reject 
given applications of the law and to indict without a judge presid-
ing over them.32 The grand jury is understood “as an institution 
that is neither strictly prosecutorial, nor strictly judicial, but 
sometimes exercises political or quasi-legislative powers.”33 With 
full control over whether to indict, grand juries have a veto-like 
power to push back on unpopular laws.34 This positioning dates 
back to their inclusion in the Bill of Rights rather than the Con-
stitution or the First Judiciary Act.35 This institutional distance 
is important, as it suggests that grand juries exist as a check on 
the government, including the judiciary, by the people. 
B. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 
Today, the structure and requirements of grand jury proceed-
ings are dictated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6. The 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, codified in 1946, aim “to 
provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, 
to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, 
and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.”36 Congress 
passed legislation in 194037 that authorized the Supreme Court to 
promulgate rules for criminal procedure, striving to balance the 
needs of law enforcement and the accused.38 The Court created a 
single set of rules of criminal procedure, which were sent to 
 
 29 Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 Fordham L Rev 2333, 2367 (2008). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Washburn, 76 Fordham L Rev at 2367 (cited in note 29). 
 34 See id at 2366 (“Blocking a law is not necessarily a prosecutorial function nor an 
adjudicative function, but a political and somewhat legislative one.”). 
 35 See id (arguing that the grand jury “was enshrined in the Bill of Rights for its 
ability to undermine unpopular laws or to block their application in the local community”). 
 36 FRCrP 2. 
 37 See Sumners Courts Act, Pub L No 76-675, 54 Stat 688 (1940), codified as 
amended at 28 USC §§ 2071–72. 
 38 Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its 
Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 Fla St U L Rev 1, 23 n 155 (1996). 
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Congress and approved.39 The adoption of Rule 6 incorporated the 
common law understanding of the grand jury into statutory law.40 
The default understanding of secrecy for the protection of the ac-
cused remained intact through subsections (d) and (e).41 Only the 
attorney for the government, the witness, the jurors, and a court 
reporter may be present during the proceedings.42 When it is time 
to vote, the grand jurors shall be left alone.43 But the Rule also 
recognizes the practical challenges for law enforcement that total 
secrecy creates. The Rule allows, for example, a government at-
torney to share grand jury information with another federal 
grand jury.44 This ensures that conflicting accounts from wit-
nesses or accused parties do not escape scrutiny across juries. 
Rule 6 details the procedural framework for how federal 
grand juries operate.45 Subsections (a)–(d) provide procedural in-
structions for how to convene. These subsections explain how to 
summon a jury, how to object to a juror, how to appoint a foreper-
son, and who may be present during the proceedings. Rule 6(e) 
outlines the requirements for disclosure or recording of the grand 
jury proceedings.46 Rule 6(e)(1) informs the parties that all pro-
ceedings are to be recorded, and any records are to be retained by 
the attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered by the 
court.47 
The subsections at issue in the circuit split are (e)(2) 
and (e)(3)—entitled “Secrecy” and “Exceptions,” respectively. 
Most of the debate is focused on Rule 6(e)(3)(E). 
The secrecy subsection is designed to inform the parties of 
who must remain silent and who may later speak about the pro-
ceedings. Rule 6(e)(2)(B) states that “[u]nless these rules provide 
otherwise, the following persons must not disclose a matter 
 
 39 See id. See also Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: 
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum L 
Rev 1433, 1440 (1984). 
 40 See Kadish, 24 Fla St U L Rev at 24 (cited in note 38). 
 41 See id. 
 42 FRCrP 6(d)(1). 
 43 FRCrP 6(d)(2). If any juror requires assistance for a hearing or speech impairment, 
the Rule also allows for an interpreter to be present to aid that juror. FRCrP 6(d)(2). 
 44 FRCrP 6(e)(3)(C). 
 45 Alex Thrasher, Judicial Construction of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)—
Historical Evolution and Circuit Interpretation Regarding Disclosure of Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings to Third Parties, 48 Cumb L Rev 587, 590 (2018). 
 46 See FRCrP 6(e). 
 47 FRCrP 6(e)(1). 
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occurring before the grand jury,”48 and then lists all the parties 
present in the proceedings listed in subsection (d), with the excep-
tion of witnesses. Witnesses may speak freely as to what they 
were asked and what they revealed. Jurors may not. 
The exceptions subsection provides the list of situations in 
which the previous requirement of secrecy may not apply. Sub-
sections (e)(3)(A)–(D) detail exceptions to the nondisclosure obli-
gation for government prosecutors.49 
Subsection (e)(3)(E) is the most relevant exception for the 
purposes of the split and this Comment because it lays out the 
instances in which the court may authorize disclosure.50 The first 
of the five options allows a court to disclose grand jury matter that 
is “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.”51 
This is the only listed exception under which the court may au-
thorize disclosure without previously receiving a request from an-
other party. The next listed exception allows a judge to disclose 
grand jury matter at the request of a defendant on the grounds 
that the material may reveal an indictment to be in error.52 The 
last three exceptions are each at the request of the government to 
show violations of the law.53 
 
 48 FRCrP 6(e)(2)(B). 
 49 See FRCrP 6(e)(3)(A)–(D). 
 50 Rule 6(e)(3)(E) states: 
The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a manner, and subject to any 
other conditions that it directs—of a grand-jury matter. See FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E): 
(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding; 
(ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dis-
miss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand 
jury; 
(iii) at the request of the government, when sought by a foreign court or 
prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation; 
(iv) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter may dis-
close a violation of State, Indian tribal, or foreign criminal law, as long as 
the disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-subdivision, Indian tribal, or 
foreign government official for the purpose of enforcing that law; or 
(v) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose 
a violation of military criminal law under the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate military official for the 
purpose of enforcing that law. 
 51 FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E)(i). 
 52 FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E)(ii). 
 53 FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E)(iii)–(v). 
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C. Supervisory Power 
Supervisory power is considered to fall within the judicial 
power conferred by Article III.54 The term “supervisory power” re-
fers to a court’s inherent authority to govern its own proceed-
ings.55 In Bank of Nova Scotia v United States,56 the Supreme 
Court explained that “[i]n the exercise of its supervisory author-
ity, a federal court may, within limits, formulate procedural rules 
not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress.”57 A 
court may invoke this power when necessary to protect judicial 
integrity.58 The Supreme Court has noted that this power is justi-
fied by the judge’s need to ensure the fairness of proceedings and 
rebuke misconduct of the parties.59 
The Court first addressed the concept of supervisory power in 
1943 in McNabb v United States.60 In McNabb, federal officers in-
terrogated several suspects accused of murder before arraigning 
them.61 Over the course of the interrogation, the suspects made 
several admissions and produced evidence that the government 
wished to use at trial.62 The officers had purposely delayed bring-
ing the suspects before a presiding judge until they admitted to 
the crime, and the Court questioned whether their interrogation 
tactics exceeded the scope of permissible conduct.63 Regarding the 
admission of their statements into evidence at trial, the Court 
held that “a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of 
justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be con-
victed upon evidence secured under the circumstances revealed 
here.”64 The exclusion of the evidence was necessary to avoid mak-
ing the courts “accomplices in wilful disobedience of the law.”65 
The Court reached this determination by relying on its “su-
pervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in 
the federal courts.”66 The principles for refusing to admit evidence 
 
 54 See Beale, 84 Colum L Rev at 1464 (cited in note 39). 
 55 Schiappa, 43 Cath U L Rev at 335 (cited in note 18). 
 56 487 US 250 (1988). 
 57 Id at 254 (quotation marks omitted). 
 58 See Beale, 84 Colum L Rev at 1464 (cited in note 39). 
 59 See Schiappa, 43 Cath U L Rev at 336 (cited in note 18). 
 60 318 US 332 (1943). 
 61 Id at 334–38. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id at 338–39. 
 64 McNabb, 318 US at 347. 
 65 Id at 345. 
 66 Id at 341. 
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are not limited to those laid out in the Constitution, the Court 
argued, but are supplemented by “rules of evidence” that “this 
Court has, from the very beginning of its history, formulated.”67 
The Court explained that federal courts have a duty to ensure the 
administration of justice and that this responsibility includes 
“maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.”68 
The Court later clarified in Carlisle v United States69 that pro-
cedural rules established by the Constitution or Congress abro-
gate the scope of a federal court’s authority to create its own pro-
cedural rules. Federal courts “may, within limits, formulate 
procedural rules,” but “[w]hatever the scope of this inherent 
power, [ ] it does not include the power to develop rules that cir-
cumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.”70 Courts may not disregard federal rules, constitutional 
provisions, or existing statutes in exercising those powers.71 When 
one of those sources of authority exists and applies to the issue at 
hand, the judge should follow the guidance of that authority.72 A 
judge may exercise supervisory power over trial proceedings only 
when there is no applicable controlling guidance.73 
* * * 
There are two possible sources of authority over the federal 
grand jury. This Part has described the differences between the 
federal grand jury and the federal trial jury, showing that the two 
entities have distinct roles and responsibilities. While a trial jury 
is an extension of the judge in seeking to determine what the law 
says, the grand jury has independent authority to indict or not 
indict without the supervision of a presiding judge. Grand jurors 
are still instructed and guided by a prosecutor, both subject to 
clear protocols laid out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6. 
The question then is whether the Federal Rules are the sole 
source of authority over the grand jury, or, as with the trial jury, 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 McNabb, 318 US at 340. 
 69 517 US 416 (1996). 
 70 Id at 426 (quotation marks omitted). See also Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 US at 254 
(“[I]t is well established that even a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power is 
invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions.”) (quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). 
 71 See Carlisle, 517 US at 426. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. 
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a district court judge can exercise supervisory power over it. This 
question has produced conflicting answers among the circuits, as 
the courts grapple with whether there is a singular source of au-
thority or that codified authority allows room for discretionary 
power. The following Part describes the slow, steady acceptance 
of supervisory power by some in following the permissive ap-
proach, and the total rejection of it by others. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The DC Circuit created a circuit split last year over the cor-
rect interpretation of Rule 6(e). The Second, Seventh, and Elev-
enth Circuits had each previously found that disclosures outside 
of the listed exceptions in Rule 6(e) could be justified by a district 
court judge’s use of the supervisory power. In contrast, the DC 
Circuit held that Rule 6(e) provides an exhaustive list of excep-
tions to the default of secrecy in grand jury proceedings. The DC 
Circuit found support for its decision from the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits, though closer examination of their holdings reveals that 
these opinions are less supportive than the DC Circuit assumed. 
With the Eleventh Circuit’s recent reversal, the exhaustive ap-
proach gained critical on-point support. 
 This Part proceeds in five sections. Part II.A examines the 
introduction of supervisory power in grand jury cases by the Sec-
ond Circuit. Part II.B describes the Eleventh Circuit’s embrace of 
supervisory power for cases “closely analogous”74 to the listed ex-
ceptions within the Rule. Part II.C details the beginning of the 
“historical significance” exception. In creating this exception, the 
Second Circuit expanded on its earlier precedent to show that rec-
ords related to events of public interest could qualify as extraor-
dinary circumstances. The first three sections show that the su-
pervisory-power exception has evolved from a one-off allowance 
that all parties agreed was warranted to a broader, more con-
tested authorization when the judge finds the aim socially 
worthwhile. 
The final two sections describe the current divide over the use 
of supervisory power to disclose grand jury records deemed his-
torically significant. While the Eleventh Circuit plays a role in the 
current split, the Seventh and DC Circuits provide the clearest 
 
 74 In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F2d 1261, 1268 (11th 
Cir 1984) (Hastings). 
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contrast in views. Despite their contrast in conclusions, both cir-
cuits believe the answer clearly lies in a close examination of the 
Rule. 
A. The Second Circuit’s Initial Departure from Rule 6(e) 
In In re Biaggi,75 the Second Circuit first addressed the pos-
sibility that disclosure could be permitted outside the Rule. The 
case before the court was unique because both the witness and 
the prosecutor endorsed disclosure.76 The witness, then- 
Congressman Mario Biaggi, was running for mayor of New York 
City.77 Biaggi had previously testified before a grand jury, and a 
New York Times report claimed that a reliable source had re-
vealed that Biaggi refused to answer questions related to his fi-
nances during those proceedings.78 Wanting to counter the report, 
Biaggi sought release of his grand jury testimony.79 Likewise, the 
US attorney agreed to move for disclosure of Biaggi’s testimony 
so long as the records removed the portions that related to other 
named witnesses.80 
Chief Judge Henry Friendly began by acknowledging that 
this case fell outside the scope of the disclosure exceptions listed 
in the Rule.81 The court struggled, however, to find an argument 
for secrecy when the witness himself sought disclosure to clear 
his name.82 Rather, if secrecy “was designed for the protection of 
the witnesses who appear, Mr. Biaggi waved this protection by 
seeking complete disclosure in the form of a motion requesting 
disclosure of his own testimony.”83 Furthermore, “[i]nsofar as the 
rule exists for the benefit of the Government, the United States 
Attorney [ ] waived it in the clearest terms.”84 The Second Circuit 
 
 75 478 F2d 489 (2d Cir 1973). 
 76 Id at 491. 
 77 Id at 490. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Biaggi, 478 F2d at 490–91. 
 80 Id at 491. 
 81 Id at 492. 
 82 See id at 493. But see United States v Johnson, 319 US 503, 513 (1943) (empha-
sizing that grand jury secrecy is “as important for the protection of the innocent as for the 
pursuit of the guilty”). Biaggi, of course, could have repeated his testimony without a court 
order, but he needed a court order to obtain the record of his testimony. See note 18. 
 83 Biaggi, 478 F2d at 493 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 84 Id. 
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decided that Biaggi and the government could waive their secrecy 
protection, and the court authorized disclosure.85 
The dissent recognized the stakes of this decision: “[W]ithout 
the support of any authority in the statute or the case law, [the 
majority] created another exception, applicable to the situation 
where a witness waives the secrecy requirement by seeking re-
lease of the grand jury minutes.”86 This decision, according to 
Judge Paul R. Hays, went beyond the scope of the Rule and its 
list of exceptions.87 In a supplemental opinion following the public 
release of Biaggi’s testimony, Chief Judge Friendly responded to 
the sharp dissent and cabined the court’s decision to its unique 
facts.88 Chief Judge Friendly emphasized that “[o]ur decision 
should therefore not be taken as demanding, or even authorizing, 
public disclosure. . . . [Disclosure] rests on the exercise of a sound 
discretion under the special circumstances of this case.”89 Unsat-
isfied, Judge Hays replied: “The law forbids the publication of 
these Grand Jury minutes. In my opinion the rules of law are a 
more reliable guide to the administration of justice than the per-
sonal views of judges as to what ‘the public interest’ may require.”90 
B. Supervisory Power over “Closely Analogous” Cases from the 
Eleventh Circuit 
In In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials91 
(Hastings), the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Second Circuit’s de-
cision in Biaggi to hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it exercised supervisory power over a situation 
similar to an authorized exception.92 The case concerned the 
grand jury proceedings of then-Judge Alcee Hastings who was un-
der investigation for a bribery charge and was later indicted and 
acquitted.93 A special committee of judges sought to determine 
whether Judge Hastings should stay on the bench, and the com-
mittee requested access to the jury records to assess his conduct.94 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id at 494 (Hays dissenting). 
 87 Biaggi, 478 F2d at 493–94 (Hays dissenting). 
 88 See id at 494 (supplemental opinion). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id (Hays dissenting). 
 91  735 F2d 1261 (11th Cir 1984). 
 92 See id at 1268. 
 93 Id at 1263. 
 94 Id at 1263–64. 
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He opposed, arguing that disclosure of the records was not per-
mitted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).95 The dis-
trict court allowed the disclosure, but in seeking to “minimize the 
breach of secrecy,” the court required that the records only be 
available for ninety days, stored in the office of the US attorney, 
and visible to the five members of the judicial committee investi-
gating Judge Hastings.96 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the committee’s 
work is “at least closely analogous” to a judicial proceeding, an 
exception to secrecy allowed under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i).97 “The pro-
cedures . . . may not be a ‘judicial proceeding’ in the strict sense 
. . . but they are very similar,”98 and therefore disclosure was ap-
propriate.99 The court added that the limited scope of the disclo-
sure and the importance of the mission of investigating possible 
corruption in the judiciary merited the use of supervisory 
power.100 
The Hastings court cited to Biaggi for the notion that common 
law principles still applied,101 and to an earlier Supreme Court 
decision to advance its idea that “the [R]ule is not the true source 
of the district court’s power.”102 The court relied on the following 
language in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co v United States103 to justify 
its conclusion that the district court had inherent power: “[T]he 
federal trial courts as well as the Courts of Appeals have been 
nearly unanimous in regarding disclosure as committed to the 
discretion of the trial judge. Our cases announce the same princi-
ple, and Rule 6(e) is but declaratory of it.”104 The Hastings court 
explained that this language showed that courts have inherent 
supervisory power beyond the language of the Rule to decide 
whether to order disclosure.105 Several more circuits would go on 
 
 95 Hastings, 735 F2d at 1264. 
 96 Id at 1265. 
 97 Id at 1268. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Hastings, 735 F2d at 1268. But see Pitch v United States, 953 F3d 1226, 1242 (11th 
Cir 2020) (en banc) (Pitch II) (Pryor concurring) (supporting the outcome but not the rea-
soning of its precedent, as “the ‘judicial proceeding’ exception, [Rule] 6(e)(3)(E)(i), plainly 
permitted the limited disclosure of the grand jury records to the Investigating Committee 
of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit in Hastings”). 
 100 Hastings, 735 F2d at 1268. 
 101 See id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 360 US 395 (1959). 
 104 Id at 399. 
 105 See Hastings, 735 F2d at 1268. 
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to rely on Hastings and its interpretation of Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co to justify discretionary power decisions. As I show, this 
reliance proved problematic. 
C. Adopting “Special Circumstances” for Historically 
Significant Cases 
Twenty-five years after deciding Biaggi, the Second Circuit 
was asked to expand the exception again. To address future cases, 
the court created a multifactor test to determine whether disclo-
sure outside of the Rule was justified, and this test and its rea-
soning have become the standard for other courts.106 In re Petition 
of Craig107 concerned a doctoral student’s request for a seventy-
nine-page grand jury transcript.108 Bruce Craig was writing his 
dissertation on Harry Dexter White, a former government official 
who had been accused of being a communist spy.109 White ap-
peared before a grand jury in 1948 to answer questions pertaining 
to the allegation before passing away several months later.110 
Craig argued that he had reviewed all publicly available evidence 
on White but needed access to the grand jury transcript to com-
plete his dissertation.111 Craig asked the court to rely on its super-
visory power to order disclosure because the information was his-
torically important and release served the public interest.112 
After emphasizing the important protections that secrecy en-
ables, the court quoted the same language as Hastings from Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co.113 Like the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, cited 
approvingly by the Second Circuit, the court used this language 
to determine that courts have discretion outside the Rule.114 The 
Craig court supplemented this understanding by drawing upon 
the “special circumstances” language of its own precedent in 
 
 106 See, for example, Carlson v United States, 837 F3d 753, 766 (7th Cir 2016); Pitch 
v United States, 915 F3d 704, 710–11 (11th Cir 2019) (Pitch I). 
 107 131 F3d 99 (2d Cir 1997). 
 108 Id at 100–01. 
 109 Id at 101. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Craig, 131 F3d at 101. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id at 102, quoting Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 360 US at 399 (“[T]he federal trial 
courts as well as the Courts of Appeals have been nearly unanimous in regarding disclo-
sure as committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Our cases announce the same prin-
ciple, and Rule 6(e) is but declaratory of it.”). 
 114 Craig, 131 F3d at 102. 
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Biaggi as evidence that its analysis did not need to be confined to 
the Rule.115 
Drawing on Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, Biaggi, and Hastings, 
the court put forward a set of nonexhaustive factors for courts to 
consider when dealing with “highly discretionary and fact-sensitive 
‘special circumstances’” cases, effectively weighing the continued 
need for secrecy against the public interest in learning about the 
case.116 One such factor advises courts to consider why the disclo-
sure is being sought but does not clarify which justifications are 
worthy. The last factor on the list ponders whether secrecy is still 
needed in that particular case. These factors and others leave a 
fair amount of room for judicial weighing and discretion. It is not 
clear what a judge should consider to determine if secrecy is still 
needed in a particular case. Furthermore, even if a witness or the 
accused no longer requires secrecy, does release of any formerly 
secret case erode the expectation of secrecy in future proceedings? 
D. The Current Permissive Approach 
The previous three sections show the course that the  
supervisory-power exception has taken to reach the current 
permissive view. The Second Circuit opened up the possibility of 
disclosures outside the Rule when it allowed a subject of the 
grand jury investigation access to his own records to clear his 
name.117 The Eleventh Circuit then determined that the kind of 
extraordinary circumstance found in the Second Circuit’s case 
could also merit disclosure in situations closely analogous to the 
exceptions within the Rule.118 Finally, the Second Circuit created 
 
 115 Id. 
 116 See id at 106. The Second Circuit identified nine factors for district courts to con-
sider. Id: 
(i) the identity of the party seeking disclosure; (ii) whether the defendant to the 
grand jury proceeding or the government opposes the disclosure; (iii) why disclo-
sure is being sought in the particular case; (iv) what specific information is being 
sought for disclosure; (v) how long ago the grand jury proceedings took place; 
(vi) the current status of the principals of the grand jury proceedings and that of 
their families; (vii) the extent to which the desired material—either permissibly 
or impermissibly—has been previously made public; (viii) whether witnesses to 
the grand jury proceedings who might be affected by disclosure are still alive; 
and (ix) the additional need for maintaining secrecy in the particular case in 
question. 
 117 See Part II.A. 
 118 See Part II.B. 
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a balancing test, weighing the public interest in the material 
against the continued need for secrecy.119 
There are two main takeaways from the prior three sections. 
First, the supervisory-power exception has grown in scope, mean-
ing that judges will face the question whether they are authorized 
to exercise supervisory power more often. Second, the courts up 
to this point had been in agreement, each finding that there are 
instances in which disclosure outside of the text of Rule 6 is al-
lowed. This unanimity is important to remember in evaluating 
the current divide. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits seemed to 
have taken as given that disclosure was allowed, until a recent 
reversal by the Eleventh Circuit. The DC Circuit now has the sup-
port of a sister circuit in pushing back, just as confident in its own 
view as its sister circuits are in the opposite conclusion. The Sev-
enth Circuit still finds room for supervisory power in the Rule’s 
permissive language.  
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Carlson v United States120 is 
the primary example of supervisory power justifying disclosure of 
historically significant grand jury materials.121 Chief Judge Diane 
Wood wrote that the answer was clear: supervisory power over 
grand jury disclosure clearly exists and works alongside the per-
missive disclosure exceptions within the Rule.122 
The Seventh Circuit offered a thorough review of Supreme 
Court precedent to argue for the existence of supervisory power. 
The court began by citing to United States v Williams,123 the most 
recent applicable Supreme Court precedent, to note that the 
grand jury works “in the courthouse and under judicial auspi-
ces.”124 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion quickly moves on from Wil-
liams, as most of that opinion focuses on why the grand jury is 
separate from the judiciary. Citing to Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co 
and United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co,125 the court explained 
 
 119 See Part II.C. 
 120 837 F3d 753 (7th Cir 2016). 
 121 For a case using the idea of inherent power to bolster the secrecy requirement, see 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F3d 18, 26 (1st Cir 2005) (holding that the court had 
“inherent judicial power” to increase the category of people bound to secrecy). See also In 
re Special Grand Jury 89–2, 450 F3d 1159, 1178 (10th Cir 2006) (noting that “some relief 
may be proper under the court’s inherent authority” but sending the case back to the dis-
trict court without deciding the issue). 
 122 See Carlson, 837 F3d at 755–56. 
 123 504 US 36 (1992). 
 124 Carlson, 837 F3d at 761 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Williams, 504 US at 47. 
 125  310 US 150 (1940). 
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that disclosure was “committed to the discretion of the trial 
judge.”126 Satisfied that supervisory power existed, the Seventh 
Circuit cautioned that Court precedent showed that “supervisory 
power is ‘a very limited one’” that “may be used only to ‘preserve 
or enhance the traditional functioning’ of the grand jury.”127 
Even with this limitation, the court explained that the ability 
to disclose at the judge’s discretion existed at common law and 
continues to exist today.128 The court repeated the language from 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co—a case decided before the creation of the 
Rules—that release of materials “‘rests in the sound discretion of 
the [trial] court’ and ‘disclosure is wholly proper where the ends 
of justice require it.’”129 The Rules did not eliminate this discretion 
because “permissive rules do not ‘abrogate the power of the courts’ 
to exercise their historical ‘inherent power’ when doing so does 
not contradict a rule.”130 Rules are permissive, the court contin-
ued, when the text permits a court to pursue some action without 
limiting language.131 The use of “may” in Rule 6(e)(3)(E), the court 
emphasized, shows the Rule to be permissive.132 
The Seventh Circuit held that the list of exceptions in 
Rule 6(e)(3)(E) is not intended to be exhaustive, meaning the dis-
trict court may act on its inherent authority without contravening 
the Rule.133 Subsection (e)(3)(E) lists five specific exceptions for 
when a court may authorize disclosure of grand jury proceedings. 
The dissent argued that subsection (e)(2)—entitled “Secrecy”—
imposes a “broad secrecy norm . . . unless [the Rules] provide oth-
erwise.”134 The Seventh Circuit explained that the key issue was 
whether subsection (e)(2)’s limiting language of “unless these 
rules provide otherwise” carries over to subsection (e)(3)(E).135 
Chief Judge Wood wrote that the use of explicit limiting language 
elsewhere in the Rule suggests that the lack of similar language 
 
 126  Carlson, 837 F3d at 761, citing Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 360 US at 399 (applying 
the disclosure principle after the codification of the Federal Rules), and Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co, 310 US at 234 (doing the same before the Federal Rules). 
 127 Carlson, 837 F3d at 762, quoting Williams, 504 US at 50. 
 128 See Carlson, 837 F3d at 762. 
 129 Id, quoting Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US at 233–34. 
 130 Carlson, 837 F3d at 763, quoting Link v Wabash Railroad Co, 370 US 626 (1962) 
(holding that the language of FRCrP 41(b) allowing a defendant to dismiss a case for lack 
of prosecution does not abrogate a court’s inherent power to dismiss sua sponte). 
 131 Carlson, 837 F3d at 763. 
 132 Id at 764. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id at 768 (Sykes dissenting) (emphasis omitted), citing FRCrP 6(e)(2)(B). 
 135 Carlson, 837 F3d at 764. 
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in subsection (e)(3)(E) is dispositive of permissive intent.136 If the 
Rule’s drafters intended the court’s authority to be limited to the 
Rule’s exceptions, they would have explicitly said so.137 The 
phrase “[t]he court may authorize disclosure” does not include 
limiting language such as “only” or “unless listed below.”138 There-
fore, the list should be interpreted to be permissive, and judges 
may act on their discretion in cases that fall outside of one of the 
five categories.139 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Second, 
Eleventh, and DC Circuits shared this view.140 Summarizing its 
opinion, the court remarked that there was not a single court that 
had accepted the government’s interpretation of the Rule as ex-
haustive, seemingly establishing the Carlson majority’s view of 
the issue as settled among the courts of appeals.141 
Judge Diane Sykes wrote an equally confident dissent, cast-
ing doubt on the majority’s assertion that no federal court had 
sided with the government’s position and downplaying the sup-
port of a sister circuit. The majority had listed the DC Circuit’s 
opinion Haldeman v Sirica142 as additional support for the per-
missive position because the court in that case affirmed the dis-
closure by a district court that was not clearly within the excep-
tions to the Rule.143 Judge Sykes noted that the Haldeman court 
did not reason through the use of supervisory power. Rather, the 
DC Circuit simply affirmed en banc the decision of the district 
court.144 Judge Sykes seemed to suggest that the court never 
reached the issue. 
Stronger support, Judge Sykes continued, came from the 
Eighth Circuit. While the relevance of Haldeman was a question 
 
 136 Id. 
 137 See id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See Carlson, 837 F3d at 764–65 (“A rule of nonexclusivity does not mean that 
Rule 6(e)(3)(E) is pointless: it would be entirely reasonable for the rulemakers to furnish 
a list that contains frequently invoked reasons to disclose grand-jury materials, so that 
the court knows that no special hesitation is necessary in those circumstances.”). 
 140 Id at 765–66. But see McKeever, 920 F3d at 847 n 3 (interpreting its own precedent 
differently). 
 141 Carlson, 837 F3d at 755–56, 765 (“[E]very federal court to consider the issue has 
adopted Carlson’s view that a district court’s limited inherent power to supervise a grand 
jury includes the power to unseal grand-jury materials when appropriate.”). 
 142 501 F2d 714 (DC Cir 1974). 
 143 Carlson, 837 F3d at 766. See also Haldeman, 501 F2d at 715 (holding that Rule 6 
did not bar a district judge from disclosing grand jury proceedings to the House Judiciary 
Committee in the context of impeachment). 
 144 Carlson, 837 F3d at 770 (Sykes dissenting). 
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of interpretation, Judge Sykes explained that the Eighth Circuit 
precedent supported her interpretation of the Rule.145 In a prior 
decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the exceptions to 
Rule 6(e)(3)(E) were exhaustive.146 Notwithstanding the major-
ity’s statements to the contrary, Judge Sykes believed that there 
was at least one sister circuit on her side. 
Moving to the substance of the issue, Judge Sykes explained 
that the majority’s reading of the Rule would make the list of ex-
ceptions nonsensical.147 By limiting the language of the previous 
subsection—“unless these rules provide otherwise”—to that sec-
tion alone, the exceptions become nonexclusive.148 This reading 
turned a list of five detailed exceptions into mere examples of 
what a court could do, leaving a court free to disclose grand jury 
testimony “to persons and for purposes not identified in the 
rule.”149 Rebuking the majority’s argument that the inherent au-
thority of courts is “very limited,” Judge Sykes instead criticized 
the decision as a step too far.150 Though the majority suggested 
that it recognized and relied upon a limited power, Judge Sykes 
found the decision to be an expansive policy judgment: “It’s hard 
to see how this ‘very limited’ authority includes the sweeping 
power to release grand-jury records to the general public for rea-
sons that strike the judge as socially desirable—here, historical 
significance.”151 The DC Circuit would go on to explicitly reject 
this type of exception. 
E. The Current Exhaustive Approach 
The DC Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit offer the two most 
recent appellate decisions on this matter, and they are now the 
two clearest examples of the exhaustive approach. The DC Circuit 
broke from the other courts while the Eleventh Circuit was still 
in the permissive camp. After reviewing its recent decision en 
banc, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and overturned its decades-
 
 145 See id. 
 146 See United States v McDougal, 559 F3d 837, 840 (8th Cir 2009) (“[C]ourts will not 
order disclosure absent a recognized exception to Rule 6(e) or a valid challenge to the orig-
inal sealing order or its implementation.”). McDougal is discussed in detail in Part II.E. 
 147 See Carlson, 837 F3d at 769 (Sykes dissenting). 
 148 See id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id at 771. 
 151 Carlson, 837 F3d at 771 (Sykes dissenting). 
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old precedent, joining the DC Circuit in holding that there is no 
inherent power outside of the Rule. 
1. The DC Circuit’s confident rejection. 
The most recent and thorough argument for limiting disclo-
sure exceptions to the confines of the Rule comes from McKeever, 
a case in which an academic sought grand jury records related to 
the disappearance of a professor and a suspected cover-up.152 
McKeever made three arguments for disclosure, none of which 
persuaded the court. First, McKeever argued that courts are not 
bound to secrecy because they are absent from the list of “persons” 
bound by Rule 6(e)(2).153 Second, he asserted that Rule 6 did not 
eliminate the preexisting authority of the trial court at common 
law, leaving the exceptions laid out in Rule 6(e)(3) as nonexhaus-
tive.154 Third, McKeever urged that the public benefit of disclosure 
was greater than the interest in secrecy.155 
The court dismissed the first argument that Rule 6(e)(2) does 
not apply to courts because “Rule 6 assumes the records are in the 
custody of the Government, not that of the court.”156 Attorneys for 
the government are included on the list of persons barred from 
disclosure; if a court ordered disclosure, it would do so by “order-
ing ‘an attorney for the government’ who holds the records to dis-
close the materials.”157 
The DC Circuit rejected the argument that district courts 
have preexisting authority outside the bounds of the Rule while 
acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit had recently come out 
the other way.158 While the Seventh Circuit argued that there was 
no statutory language that required curtailing the Rule to the ex-
ceptions of Rule 6(e)(3), the DC Circuit replied that “[t]he limiting 
language the Seventh Circuit sought is plain: Rule 6(e)(2) prohib-
its disclosure of a grand jury matter unless these rules provide 
otherwise.”159 The court argued that subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) 
must be read together.160 Allowing a district court to go beyond 
 
 152 See McKeever, 920 F3d at 843. 
 153 Id at 847. See also FRCrP 6(e)(2). 
 154 McKeever, 920 F3d at 848. See also FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E). 
 155 McKeever, 920 F3d at 849. 
 156 Id at 848. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id at 848–49. 
 159 McKeever, 920 F3d at 848 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 160 Id at 845. 
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those explicit exceptions would “render the detailed list of excep-
tions merely precatory and impermissibly enable the court to ‘cir-
cumvent’ or ‘disregard’ a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure.”161 
Though the DC Circuit’s decision marked the clearest break from 
the other circuits, the majority relied on support from two sister 
courts, the Sixth and the Eighth Circuits. 
The Sixth Circuit emphasized in In re Grand Jury 89-4-72162 
that “Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) is not a rule of convenience.”163 Grand jury 
secrecy is not something to be taken lightly, and courts should 
exercise caution before considering disclosure: “[W]ithout an un-
ambiguous statement to the contrary from Congress, we cannot, 
and must not, breach grand jury secrecy for any purpose other 
than those embodied by the Rule.”164 Both the DC Circuit and 
Sixth Circuit cited the Supreme Court statement that “[i]n the 
absence of a clear indication in a statute or Rule, we must always 
be reluctant to conclude that a breach of this secrecy has been 
authorized.”165 The Sixth Circuit held that an investigation into a 
state judge did not fall within the bounds of being “preliminarily 
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding” and therefore de-
nied disclosure of the material.166 While the sentence from the 
Sixth Circuit that the DC Circuit cited seems like direct support 
for its position, the context of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion con-
cerned a different subsection of Rule 6.167 The order of the Rule’s 
subsections has been edited over the years, and the subsection 
referenced in the quote pertained to whether disclosure to a com-
mission investigating a state judge is ordered “preliminarily to or 
in connection with a judicial proceeding.”168 
While the Sixth Circuit precedent is not precisely on point, 
the court’s position still suggests an exhaustive interpretation of 
the Rule. While many of the circuits emphasize the importance of 
grand jury secrecy, the Sixth Circuit places great weight on the 
Rule itself. The Rule is not to be followed simply when it is con-
venient, and courts should be hesitant to disclose without a rule 
 
 161 Id, quoting Carlisle, 517 US at 426. 
 162 932 F2d 481 (6th Cir 1991). 
 163 Id at 488. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id at 483, quoting United States v Sells Engineering, Inc, 463 US 418, 425 (1983). 
See also McKeever, 920 F3d at 844. 
 166 In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F2d at 482 (quotation marks omitted). 
 167 For the current location of the language, see FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E)(i). 
 168 See In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F2d at 482 (quotation marks omitted). 
1670 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1647 
 
or statute authorizing them to do so. While the Sixth Circuit has 
not weighed in on the precise question before the other courts, it 
seems likely that the Sixth Circuit will interpret its precedent to 
provide support for an exhaustive approach. 
The DC Circuit relied on the Eighth Circuit for more direct 
support for its reasoning. In United States v McDougal,169 Susan 
McDougal sought an unsealed copy of her own testimony in an 
earlier civil contempt proceeding.170 The court noted that 
“[a]lthough McDougal’s appellate brief and argument suggest 
that her request for access was motivated by a desire to recount 
in a screenplay or novel [the independent counsel]’s allegedly co-
ercive tactics in the Whitewater investigation, she did not men-
tion this in the district court.”171 Instead, McDougal’s only argu-
ment for disclosure was that significant time had passed and 
“[t]he reasons for sealing the record have now grown stale and 
disappeared.”172 The court found this argument unpersuasive, ex-
plaining that “courts will not order disclosure absent a recognized 
exception to Rule 6(e) or a valid challenge to the original sealing 
order or its implementation.”173 The majority in McKeever and 
Judge Sykes’s Carlson dissent identified this language as sup-
portive of their side of the debate. 
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s long road to the exhaustive 
approach. 
The Eleventh Circuit first decided Pitch v United States174 
(Pitch I) in February 2019. The case marked the most recent court 
of appeals decision affirming supervisory power. In Pitch I, the 
Eleventh Circuit considered an argument for a historical signifi-
cance exception to Rule 6(e).175 The court relied on its prior deci-
sion in Hastings and the Second Circuit’s Craig factors to deter-
mine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
disclosing the records.176 
 
 169 559 F3d 837 (8th Cir 2009). 
 170 Id at 838. 
 171 Id at 841 (quotation marks omitted). 
 172 Id. 
 173 McDougal, 559 F3d at 840. 
 174 915 F3d 704 (11th Cir 2019). 
 175 See id at 707. 
 176 See id at 707, 711–13. 
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The majority in Pitch I explained that it affirmed the use of 
supervisory power because it was bound by Hastings.177 But the 
Hastings opinion was narrower. The Hastings court emphasized 
that the case before it was “closely analogous” to an exception 
within the Rule.178 While the court did authorize the use of inher-
ent power, the court cabined its decision by focusing on the situa-
tion’s similarity to the Rule’s exception. It is not obvious that a 
rule allowing disclosure on the policy ground of historical signifi-
cance must follow from Hastings. 
After a deeply divided opinion, the Eleventh Circuit chose to 
rehear the case en banc. Not only did the court reverse its decision 
in Pitch I,179 it also overruled Hastings, “the seminal case on non-
6(e) grand jury disclosure,” in the process.180 The stakes of rever-
sal are significant. Hastings was responsible for the interpreta-
tion of Supreme Court precedent that influenced the Second Cir-
cuit in Craig, which the Seventh Circuit in turn relied on in 
Carlson. 
Despite its influential role in the early adoption of the per-
missive interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit now holds that 
“Rule 6(e) by its plain terms limits disclosures of grand jury ma-
terials to the circumstances enumerated therein.”181 The Eleventh 
Circuit addressed the precedential support from the Supreme 
Court182 and the DC Circuit before grounding its answer in the 
text.183 According to the Eleventh Circuit, not only is there no his-
torical significance exception, there is also no inherent power to 
disclose whatsoever.184 Like its sister circuits, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit found comfort in the plain language of the Rule. 
 
 177 Id at 707 (“Because we are bound by our decision in Hastings, we affirm.”). 
 178 Hastings, 735 F2d at 1268. 
 179 See Pitch II, 953 F3d at 1241. 
 180 Craig, 131 F3d at 103. 
 181 Pitch II, 953 F3d at 1234 (emphasis added). 
 182 See id at 1235 (“[T]he Supreme Court explained that the exception ‘is, on its face, 
an affirmative limitation on the availability of court-ordered disclosure of grand jury ma-
terials.’”), quoting United States v Baggot, 463 US 476, 479 (1983). 
 183 See Pitch II, 953 F3d at 1234: 
The text and structure of Rule 6(e) thus indicate that the rule is not merely per-
missive. Rather, it imposes a general rule of nondisclosure, then instructs that 
deviations from that rule are not permitted “[u]nless these rules provide other-
wise,” and then provides a detailed list of exceptions that specifies precisely 
when the rules “provide otherwise.” 
 184 See id at 1236–37. 
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Satisfied with the text, the court then addressed the implica-
tions for the grand jury itself if the permissive approach continues 
unchecked. Recognizing inherent power to disclose—and specifi-
cally, recognizing that power for historically significant docu-
ments—puts far too much discretionary power in the hands of 
judges: 
[T]he creation of a historical-significance exception involves 
two layers of policy judgments. The first is the decision to rec-
ognize an exception for matters of historical significance gen-
erally. The second involves deciding what it means for some-
thing to be so “historically significant” that the interest in 
disclosure outweighs any interest that the grand jurors, wit-
nesses, and future generations, among others, have in main-
taining the secrecy of the proceedings. Under [Marion] 
Pitch’s interpretation of Rule 6(e), then, a single district 
judge would have the authority to substitute his or her own 
judgments on these policy questions on a case-by-case basis, 
with the inevitable result that the exceptions to the general 
rule of grand jury secrecy would vary from one court to the 
next across the nation.185 
This case-by-case decision-making means that witnesses and 
jurors may no longer be able to rely on the promised secrecy of the 
proceedings.186 If these participants fear that their responses will 
one day be released, the concern may “have a chilling effect on 
future grand jury witnesses and would render the grand jury as 
an institution inoperable.”187 
* * * 
The circuit split reveals a muddled landscape of decisions un-
likely to be reconciled on their own. The courts have sought to 
bolster their stances with precedent from their sister circuits, 
even when the support is ambiguous. Likewise, some of the courts 
have relied on precedent that is inapposite when viewed in con-
text. The problem arises in part from the indeterminate bounda-
ries of supervisory power. Over time courts have built on one an-
other’s allowances until supervisory power has grown to allow 
disclosure when the judge deems release appropriate. What 
 
 185 Id at 1236 n 9. 
 186 See id. 
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began as a one-time exception in Biaggi, where all parties sought 
disclosure, grew to incorporate cases that were closely analogous 
to the Rule. From there, the exception grew to allow disclosure for 
historically significant documents, and courts taking the permis-
sive approach began to rely on a fact-intensive and nonexhaustive 
balancing test for guidance. The DC Circuit rejected this ap-
proach, returning to the Rule in holding that the text was exhaus-
tive. The Eleventh Circuit has now joined it. 
III.  BEYOND THE TEXT: A MORE CONTEXTUALIZED PROPOSAL 
FOR AN EXHAUSTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE 
The current divide offers a thorough and complete analysis of 
the text of the Rule. If the remaining circuits continue to debate 
the text alone, however, the stalemate will likely continue. Both 
sides have compelling textual arguments, but neither is correct in 
maintaining that the text is decisive. This Part begins by explain-
ing why the DC Circuit’s reasoning, though coming to the correct 
conclusion, is unconvincing. Text alone is unlikely to persuade the 
remaining circuits, as the permissive approach has equally strong 
textual arguments. After showing why a textual analysis is insuf-
ficient, this Comment lays out alternative sources of authority 
that, when considered collectively, make a strong case for an ex-
haustive interpretation. 
First, the historical origins of the grand jury show that the 
institution was a separate entity from the executive and the judi-
ciary, suggesting that any supervisory power over those proceed-
ings was intended to be limited. Second, any disclosures allowed 
by way of supervisory power were absorbed into the codification 
of the Rule on grand jury disclosure. Third, the circuits advocat-
ing for a permissive approach misread post-Rules Supreme Court 
precedent, confusing discretion within the Rule with discretion 
outside of the Rule. Fourth, more recent Supreme Court prece-
dent sharply undermines the argument that district courts retain 
supervisory power over the grand jury. Finally, while increases in 
the use of supervisory power to justify disclosure may be a judicial 
response to perceived weakness in the grand jury, policy pushes 
against judicial overreach. Instead, Congress should authorize 
broader disclosure power for district courts under the Rule. With 
any important grand jury record, there may come a point when 
the public’s interest in learning the truth of the nation’s past out-
weighs the continuing need for secrecy. Congress, not individual 
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district court judges, should decide when that time has come. The 
former is capable of amending the Rule for all, ensuring the Rule’s 
primacy as the source of controlling guidance. The latter could 
only release outside of the Rules or not at all, risking case-by-case 
confusion. 
A. The DC Circuit’s Approach Is Incomplete 
The Eleventh and DC Circuits have the right answer—but 
for the wrong reasons. The DC Circuit relies almost exclusively 
on a textual analysis, concluding that the language is clearly ex-
haustive and therefore no supervisory power exists over disclo-
sure. This result is both puzzling and unsatisfying. Both sides of 
the split seem unwilling to acknowledge that there is genuine un-
certainty within the text. 
Congress could have made the answer clear by including ex-
plicit limiting language. Rule 6(e)(3)(E) could read, for example, 
that the “court may authorize disclosure . . . of a grand jury mat-
ter only” in the following situations before listing the five excep-
tions. Alternatively, Congress could have concluded the list of ex-
ceptions with the phrase “and in no other circumstances.” 
According to the permissive approach, the lack of clear Congres-
sional signals reveals that the Rule was intended to be open-ended. 
The exhaustive approach has several arguments in response. 
There is explicit limiting language in the “Secrecy” subsection, 
the section immediately preceding the exceptions listed in 
Rule 6(e)(3). When Congress authorized Rule 6(e)(2) to read 
“[u]nless these rules provide otherwise” in limiting disclosures,188 
surely they intended that limitation to extend to these rules and 
not only the subsection in which that language is found. If disclo-
sure is not allowed unless authorized by these rules, courts have 
no basis for looking outside of them. Even if a court wanted to 
limit its analysis to the “Exceptions” subsection, it must 
acknowledge that there are five listed exceptions for a court. If 
Congress intended courts to have more opportunities to disclose, 
why did it not include a catchall for extraordinary circumstances? 
According to the exhaustive approach, the limiting language in 
Rule 6(e)(2) clearly applies to the section that follows, and the use 
of a list of exceptions should be understood to be finite. 
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While both sides argue persuasively for their interpretations, 
the most likely answer is that the Rule is simply unclear on its 
face. Textual evidence points in both directions. Just as there is 
no “only,” there is no clear “not limited to” or “and in extraordi-
nary circumstances” exception. There is a subsection on secrecy, 
followed immediately by a subsection on exceptions. No mention 
of supervisory power, historical significance, or disclosures out-
side the norm of secrecy can be found in the text. 
The absence of textual clarity means that the solution must 
be found elsewhere. I argue that the Eleventh and DC Circuits 
reach the correct conclusion, but their arguments would have 
been aided by a look at the historical origins of the grand jury. 
This history reveals that the grand jury was never meant to fall 
under the judiciary but rather to operate as a separate entity, one 
endowed with both judicial and prosecutorial powers. This history 
begins to make the case for why supervisory power is more limited 
in the context of the grand jury than the trial. By showing that 
supervisory power over grand jury disclosures no longer exists, 
my analysis finds a way around the textual ambiguity. Without 
supervisory power over grand juries, the exceptions to the Rule 
stand alone. 
B. History Shows the Grand Jury Was Intended to Be 
Independent 
The historical origins of the grand jury reveal that the insti-
tution was designed to act autonomously, free from executive and 
judicial interference. Returning to the rise of the grand jury in 
England and its later adoption in the colonies, I argue that the 
grand jury was intended to operate as a hybrid, independent in-
stitution for the public. Combining judicial setting and procedure 
with executive-like power to indict, the grand jury was set up as 
a panel for the people—a check on the two branches that it was 
created to resemble. 
1. English origins. 
The grand jury originated in England in the twelfth cen-
tury.189 It initially involved royal justices and a jury composed of 
 
 189 See generally R.H. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon 
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men selected by the Crown.190 These twelve “good and lawful men” 
of every township were designated as the accusing body.191 They 
served as “a system of local informers,” disclosing the names of 
suspected offenders to the king.192 Over time, the juries began con-
sidering allegations made by nonjury members and nonofficials.193 
A royal prosecutor would lay out the evidence and witnesses of 
the accused.194 If the jury was convinced, it returned a “true bill,” 
a decision marking the allegation as true, or a “no bill,” a decision 
deeming the allegation to be false.195 Because of royal involve-
ment, “no bills” were rarely found.196 Any jury that failed to indict 
a suspect that the Crown put forward was fined.197 Despite the 
involvement of royal prosecutors, jury members kept the ability 
to accuse and indict on their own.198 
The jury’s task was not limited to indicting enemies of the 
Crown; it investigated conduct that affected the people in their 
daily lives.199 Jurors inquired about the collection of taxes and the 
condition of public works, including the upkeep of roads, high-
ways, bridges, and jails.200 An oath of secrecy also developed dur-
ing this period, as the men declared that “they will lawful pre-
sentment make of such chapters as shall be delivered to them in 
writing and in this they will not fail for any love, hatred, fear, 
reward, or promise, and that they will conceal the secrets, so help 
them God and the Saints.”201 
An expanded role and the ability to keep its discussions se-
cret allowed the grand jury to grow in power and popularity. 
Grand juries stood up to political pressure from the Crown and 
from the government, solidifying a reputation for courage and 
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independence.202 Proponents of the grand jury heralded it as a ve-
hicle for liberty and public oversight.203 That reputation quickly 
caught the attention of the American colonists.204 
2. Colonial adoption. 
Grand juries were already well on their way in the colonies, 
with colonists following the English path and relying on jurors for 
indictments.205 In contrast to England, the colonial grand juries 
exercised more independence from the start.206 While English ju-
ries had to rely on royal officials to refer bills of indictment, lim-
ited local government and policing meant that the colonial juries 
took on this task themselves.207 Colonial grand jurors often pre-
sented matters on their own, turning the investigation upon mag-
istrates or local leaders, like ministers who negligently failed to 
do their duty by “not checking upon those who failed to attend 
church on Sunday.”208 
Grand juries gained favor in the colonies in no small part be-
cause of the political writings of English advocates. Lord Chan-
cellor John Somers, an English proponent of the grand jury and 
popular author in the colonies, proposed that grand juries did not 
need to rely on judges in carrying out their role.209 Somers argued 
that jury power should be construed broadly and was not limited 
to the matters that the judge presented to them.210 The English 
legal theorist Sir John Hawles praised the grand jury as the pro-
tector of the public against government persecution, rejecting the 
idea that courts have the power to influence their decisions.211  
Finally, the English writer Henry Care emphasized that grand 
juries must be able to make autonomous decisions, free from ju-
dicial oversight and involvement.212 These works guided the colo-
nists as to the proper power and role of the grand jury.213 
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By the time of the Revolution, the grand jury was a key part 
of colonial checks on government. These juries represented the 
people, enforcing only those laws they deemed to be just and 
standing up against persecution at home and abroad.214 The 
struggle to wrest authority from the grand jury came to a head in 
1768 when Boston grand jurors refused to indict the editors of the 
Boston Gazette for libel of the governor.215 The chief justice of Mas-
sachusetts instructed the jury that “they might depend upon be-
ing damned if they did not find a true bill.”216 Nevertheless, the 
jurors refused, and “the chief justice was helpless” to change their 
minds.217 
When the Constitution of the United States went into effect, 
the grand jury was left out.218 The centralized government would 
include three separate branches, and the Constitution prescribed 
the powers of each.219 When the federal court system was ex-
panded under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the grand jury was still 
excluded.220 
The public’s desire for the right to indictment through a 
grand jury was taken up by the states in ratification.221 In 1791, 
Congress approved twelve constitutional amendments that were 
then sent to the states for ratification.222 The Fifth Amendment 
was adopted with the Bill of Rights, constitutionally enshrining 
the grand jury: “[N]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury.”223 The Framers sought for the American 
grand jury, “like its English forerunner, to act as both a ‘sword 
and a shield.’”224 More specifically: 
As a sword, the grand jury has extraordinary power to carry 
out its investigatory function. . . . Although these powers are 
exercised under the court’s supervision and are not 
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unlimited, the grand jury may use them to obtain every 
man’s evidence. As a shield, the grand jury is designed to pro-
vide a fair method for instituting criminal proceedings. The 
grand jury, after deliberating in secret, allows the govern-
ment to prosecute only those persons for whom it has proba-
ble cause to believe have committed a crime.225 
Long after the proceedings are over, the deliberations remain 
secret. The Supreme Court affirmed in United States v Johnson226 
that secrecy is “as important for the protection of the innocent as 
for the pursuit of the guilty.”227 Those who are not indicted can 
move on, free from the shadow of persecution that would remain 
if their testimony was disclosed.228 Those who will later be called 
as witnesses may speak freely, knowing that their answers will 
not be revealed to those that may wish them harm.229 Those jurors 
who are called upon to weigh the statements of those witnesses 
can trust that the witnesses or conspirators are not privy to the 
statements of those who have testified before them.230 Those that 
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are called upon to judge their peers have the privacy to evaluate 
the indictment free from the oversight of a judge.231 
Since before the time of the Founding, the grand jury has pos-
sessed “broad inquisitorial powers.”232 While these powers were 
“derived from the government,” the juries are “of the people, not 
of the state.”233 While the grand jury is weaker and more reliant 
on the prosecution than it once was, the historical separation 
sheds light on the intended relationship between the government, 
the judiciary, and the grand jury. The grand jury was intended to 
be independent of both. As prosecutors have exerted more power 
over grand jury proceedings, judges may react by seeking to insert 
themselves into the proceedings as well as a form of oversight. 
While well-intentioned, executive overreach does not justify the 
same from the judiciary. 
History shows that the grand jury solidified its position in the 
Bill of Rights by serving as the voice of the people and a check on 
the government. Rather than an appendage or subsidiary of the 
courts, the grand jury has always operated in a gray area, oper-
ating under the auspices of the judiciary while maintaining inves-
tigative power more similar to that of the executive. This position-
ing continues to be important today, as judges must recognize 
that the grand jury is intentionally different from the trial jury 
over which they preside. The independent grand jury that the col-
onists sought was not guided or directed by a judge. That institu-
tional relationship suggests that supervisory power was limited 
from the beginning. If there was little to no supervisory power 
from the start, the current argument for maintaining supervisory 
power loses its foundation. 
C. Pre-Rules Uses of Supervisory Power Were Incorporated 
into the Rule’s Codified Exceptions 
The permissive view emphasized pre-Rules discretion as a 
sign that supervisory power existed at common law. But the type 
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of disclosures allowed through pre-Rules discretion are now al-
lowed by the Rule’s listed exceptions, suggesting that the Rule 
has absorbed that authority. 
The Seventh Circuit in Carlson relied on Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co for a pre-Rules testament to common law discretion. The court 
pointed to language that release of materials “rests in the sound 
discretion of the [trial] court” and “disclosure is wholly proper 
where the ends of justice require it.”234 In Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 
the Court wrote that “use of grand jury testimony for the purpose 
of refreshing the recollection of a witness rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge.”235 While it initially appears compelling 
that judges were permitted discretion, it is worth situating this 
discretion in the historical moment, a time before the codification 
of the Rules and before any disclosure was formally authorized. 
The decision in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co illustrates an attempt 
by the Court to allow for some disclosure. The grand jury was his-
torically expected to keep all matters secret. With no formal rule 
allowing for disclosure and a default of secrecy, the Court recog-
nized that release of some materials may benefit the proceedings. 
To help the grand jury reach its verdict, for example, the Court 
allowed jurors to have access to previously undisclosed state-
ments of witnesses.236 Total secrecy was not in the interest of the 
grand jury and Socony-Vacuum Oil Co recognized that there were 
some situations in which disclosure aided the process, such as 
with recall of evidence. 
This discretion was already closely related to the needs of the 
particular grand jury in session, and the Federal Rules used sim-
ilar examples when it adopted exceptions to the secrecy norm. The 
allowed disclosure within Socony-Vacuum Oil Co now seemingly 
falls within the scope of Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i)—using grand jury ma-
terial to refresh a witness’s recollection is using it “in connection 
with a judicial proceeding.”237 Rather than showing that inherent 
discretion survived the codification of the Rules, Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co should be read as an example of the kind of disclosure that 
they incorporated. The Rule’s exceptions are limited in their scope 
and are acknowledgments that secrecy may not always be the 
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best approach for the mission of the grand jury. Allowing a wit-
ness access to review his own previous statement is a far cry 
from permitting full release of records to a doctoral student for 
his dissertation. 
This interpretation aligns with the understanding that 
Rule 6(e)’s adoption codified the common law pertaining to grand 
jury secrecy.238 The Advisory Committee Note for Rule 6(e) ex-
plains that the Rule “continues the traditional practice of secrecy 
. . . except when the court permits a disclosure.”239 This allowance 
for disclosure meant that the preexisting principle of grand jury 
secrecy, developed in England and continuing throughout the in-
stitution’s history, persisted with the exception that courts now 
could exercise a disclosure option.240 
Professors Lori E. Shaw and Susan W. Brenner, authors of 
an oft-cited treatise on the grand jury, refer to the Rule’s approach 
as “common law plus.”241 Rule 6 “codified the common law plus it 
authorized disclosure to defendants challenging an indictment for 
grand jury irregularities.”242 
If pre–Federal Rules courts did have the “inherent power” to 
give defendants grand jury information, the rule absorbed 
that power; if they did not have that power, the rule gave it 
to them. Either way, Rule 6(e) represents the sum total of a 
federal court’s authority to allow access to “matters occurring 
before the grand jury.”243 
The accused may challenge perceived misconduct or proce-
dural errors, and these were common reasons why judges resorted 
to their inherent power to disclose at common law.244 Accordingly, 
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the Rule now allows a court to disclose information pertaining to 
a grand jury proceeding to “a defendant upon a showing that 
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because 
of matters occurring before the grand jury.”245 Because there was 
“no right of discovery before trial” at common law, judges often 
had to rely on inherent power arguments in order to rectify this 
perceived wrong.246 Congress incorporated this judge-made dis-
cretion into one of the Rule’s exceptions.247 Shaw and Brenner ar-
gue that the Rule continues the default understanding of secrecy 
while absorbing the common law need for disclosure. 
Pre-Rules discretion has been used as evidence in support of 
continued supervisory power, but this earlier discretion is not dis-
positive evidence of discretion today. Shaw and Brenner convinc-
ingly make the case for a “common law plus” understanding of the 
Rule, where any supervisory power that existed at common law 
was incorporated into the Rule’s exceptions. Early supervisory 
power was itself limited and a response to the judiciary’s need to 
allow for some disclosure under the harsh default of complete se-
crecy. Complete secrecy is no longer required. Judges may allow 
the same releases they sought at common law, now through the 
authority of the Rule. This understanding is bolstered by the 
Court’s handling of supervisory power after the Rule’s codification. 
D. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co Has Been Misinterpreted 
The permissive approach likewise relies on Court precedent 
that describes judicial discretion as a justification for its use of 
supervisory power. Critically, courts have read Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co’s language regarding discretion out of context. This 
problem was exacerbated when the Eleventh and the Seventh 
Circuits cited to and followed the language of the Second Circuit’s 
original misreading of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 
Courts adopting the permissive view repeatedly cite to one 
line in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co: “[T]he federal trial courts as 
well as the Courts of Appeals have been nearly unanimous in re-
garding disclosure as committed to the discretion of the trial 
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judge. Our cases announce the same principle, and Rule 6(e) is 
but declaratory of it.”248 From only this line, it is understandable 
that this language has been interpreted to mean that the Rule 
has done nothing to change a judge’s ability to exercise discretion 
regarding disclosure of grand jury materials. If supervisory power 
existed before the Rule, the argument goes, it apparently contin-
ues to do so today. The problem with this approach is that the 
“discretion” referred to by the Court pertains to discretion of a 
judge to deny disclosure even when it is permitted by one of the 
Rule’s exceptions. The Court was describing a very different type 
of discretion—the discretion a trial court judge has within the pa-
rameters of the Rules, not outside of them. 
The problem with the permissive approach becomes clear 
when one returns to the rest of the Court’s Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Co opinion. The petitioner argued that the district court was re-
quired to release the grand jury materials because the case fell 
under one of the prescribed exceptions in Rule 6(e).249 But the Su-
preme Court was not persuaded.250 It was not enough that the 
case fell under the scope of the Rule because the petitioner failed 
to meet the burden of “particularized need.”251 To “outweigh[ ] the 
policy of secrecy,” one must show a particularized need for the 
specific materials requested.252 Whether that burden has been 
met is up to the discretion of the trial judge.253 Therefore, Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co should not be understood as allowing trial 
judges broad discretion in any case concerning grand jury disclo-
sures. Rather, the precedent supports disclosure only in those 
cases that already fall within the confines of an exception to 
Rule 6(e). The sentence immediately preceding the contested lan-
guage makes this argument decisive: “Petitioners concede, as 
they must, that any disclosure of grand jury minutes is covered 
by [Rule] 6(e) promulgated by this Court in 1946 after the ap-
proval of Congress.”254 
The circuits following the permissive interpretation have con-
tinually relied on Socony-Vacuum Oil Co’s pre-Rules interpreta-
tion and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co’s post-Rules justification. As 
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the previous two sections show, this reliance seems to have led 
the circuits astray from the original intention of the Court. While 
the Court over time acknowledged that some disclosures were 
helpful for the operation of the grand jury, secrecy has always 
been the norm. Where discretion has been authorized, it has been 
authorized for courts to lean toward the choice to not release, ra-
ther than to release. Secrecy, rather than disclosure, is the de-
fault assumption. More recent Supreme Court precedent, mostly 
overlooked by the permissive view but addressed by the dissent 
in Carlson, call into question the belief that supervisory power 
exists outside of the Rule. 
E. Recent Supreme Court Precedent Also Sharply Undermines 
the Permissive Argument 
In relying so heavily on Socony-Vacuum Oil Co and Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co, courts miss more recent Supreme Court 
guidance on supervisory power over the grand jury. Two cases, 
United States v Williams, authored in 1992, and United States v 
Baggot,255 handed down in 1983, call into the question the as-
sumption that supervisory power exists over the grand jury at all. 
1. United States v Williams. 
The Supreme Court in Williams stressed the limited nature 
of the judiciary’s power over the grand jury. The question before 
the Court was whether a district court could dismiss an indict-
ment that was otherwise valid because the attorney for the gov-
ernment did not disclose “substantial exculpatory evidence” to the 
grand jury.256 John H. Williams Jr, the subject of an indictment 
for financial crimes,257 argued that the Court’s previous holding in 
United States v Hasting258 suggested that disclosure should be al-
lowed under district courts’ supervisory power.259 In Hasting, the 
Court had noted that federal courts “may, within limits, formu-
late procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution 
or by the Congress.”260 Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin 
Scalia explained that decisions on discretion in the trial context 
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were distinguishable from the grand jury context. Looking to his-
tory, Justice Scalia emphasized that grand juries were different: 
“Because the grand jury is an institution separate from the 
courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside, we think 
it clear that, as a general matter at least, no such ‘supervisory’ 
judicial authority exists.”261 The Court held that the federal judi-
ciary lacks supervisory authority to compel a prosecutor to dis-
close exculpatory evidence.262 More important for present pur-
poses, it gave a clear signal about the lack of supervisory power 
over the grand jury.263 
Justice Scalia began with a reminder that the grand jury “has 
not been textually assigned [ ] to any of the branches”264 and is 
therefore “a constitutional fixture in its own right.”265 While ac-
knowledging that the grand jury “normally operates . . . in the 
courthouse and under judicial auspices,” he argued that its rela-
tionship to the judiciary was “at arm’s length.”266 The role of a 
judge in these proceedings was limited to calling the grand jurors 
and administering their oaths.267 The grand jury must be “free to 
pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence or su-
pervision”268 as “the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional guarantee 
presupposes an investigative body acting independently of either 
prosecuting attorney or judge.”269 
After establishing the operational independence of the grand 
jury, Justice Scalia explained that “it should come as no surprise 
that we have been reluctant to invoke the judicial supervisory 
power as a basis for prescribing modes of grand jury procedure.”270 
If federal courts have the power to create rules of grand jury pro-
cedure, it “is a very limited one, not remotely comparable to the 
power they maintain over their own proceedings.”271 
Carlson began its defense of supervisory power by citing to 
Williams, but the Seventh Circuit’s view advocates a position that 
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Williams apparently rejects. Justice Scalia firmly endorsed grand 
jury independence and cautioned against courts extending their 
powers onto them. While the Seventh Circuit cited to Williams for 
the point that courts had “a very limited” power over grand ju-
ries,272 the sentence in full read that “[t]hese authorities suggest 
that any power federal courts may have to fashion, on their own 
initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one, not 
remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own 
proceedings.”273 This language is not an endorsement of supervi-
sory power of the grand jury. Instead, Justice Scalia said that 
even if there is limited power—a question the Court did not de-
cide—it is nowhere near as expansive as that of courts’ supervi-
sory power over trials. 
Furthermore, even if there is limited supervisory power, it is 
one thing to say there is limited supervisory power over proceed-
ings, and quite another to say there is limited supervisory power 
to disclose those proceedings. The former allows for intervention 
to ensure the legitimacy and integrity of the proceedings. The lat-
ter affords a judge the singular authority to reveal what is other-
wise secret. While Carlson uses Williams’s language that the 
grand jury convenes “in the courthouse and under judicial auspi-
ces” to support the idea that it operates under judicial control,274 
Williams again says in full that “[a]lthough the grand jury nor-
mally operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial 
auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch 
has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length.”275 Williams 
and the permissive approach circuits are making different points: 
Williams brings up the institutional relationship to question the 
extent of judicial control. The permissive approach relies on judi-
cial control as a given to justify the use of supervisory power. 
2. United States v Baggot. 
While Williams explained why supervisory power is so lim-
ited over the grand jury, Baggot suggested that the Court would 
not consider disclosure under the supervisory power to be a pos-
sibility. The Supreme Court in Baggot answered whether a 
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district court could allow grand jury documents to be disclosed in 
order to assess a grand jury defendant’s income tax liability.276 
The district court had concluded that disclosure was not author-
ized under the Rule but had allowed its release under the district 
court’s “general supervisory powers over the grand jury.”277 The 
Supreme Court did not mention this supervisory power again in 
its opinion. Instead, it looked to the Rule to determine whether 
disclosure was allowed.278 The Court, when given the opportunity, 
made no indication that there was an alternative to the listed ex-
ceptions. In contrast, the Court emphasized the language and 
specificity of the text: “[The list of exceptions] reflects a judgment 
that not every beneficial purpose, or even every valid governmen-
tal purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury se-
crecy.”279 Thus, the Supreme Court focused on applying the Rule 
as written, with no indication that supervisory power existed as 
an alternative. 
When given the chance to address supervisory power to dis-
close, the Court ignored its use and decided the case based solely 
on the language of the Rule. This decision suggests that the Court 
believes the Rule to be the only valid source of disclosure authority. 
F. Policy Cautions Against Expanding Judicial Intervention 
The permissive approach began as a one-off allowance in 
Biaggi. Then, Hastings permitted disclosure when the Rule was 
closely analogous to the situation. Now, the permissive approach 
endorses disclosure when the end is socially desirable. This evolv-
ing expansion results in judicial overreach. While the Supreme 
Court has affirmed the existence of some supervisory power, the 
lack of statutory or constitutional grounding means that judges 
are without guidance as to its breadth or application to the grand 
jury.280 
Unencumbered by doctrinal limitations, the open-ended lan-
guage of the phrase “supervisory power” has invited an expansive 
interpretation. Courts employing supervisory power have 
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generally felt relatively free to adopt rules intended to promote 
what the courts identify as the ends of justice and good public 
policy.281 
While this poses a problem for the lower courts in general, it 
is especially vexing in the context of grand jury proceedings.282 
Cases in which a judge would exert supervisory power over a 
grand jury create a “conflict between the Executive and Judicial 
branches of the federal government over their respective relation-
ships to the federal grand jury.”283 Professor Sara Sun Beale con-
tends that judicial interference with the grand jury should be ex-
tremely limited so that it may “be free to pursue its investigations 
unhindered by external influence or supervision.”284 The lack of 
interference ensures that grand juries are free to make the deci-
sion that reflects the will of the people. Grand juries are not de-
termining guilt or innocence. They are determining whether the 
government has made a sufficient case to indict an accused. They 
have independent authority to indict or not to indict. Though a 
prosecutor may argue for a certain outcome, the choice is sup-
posed to ultimately be the grand jury’s own as the voice of the 
people. The grand jury developed secrecy in part to protect itself 
from judicial interference.285 More oversight is not necessarily for 
the better. 
While this view was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Wil-
liams, limiting judicial oversight to the Rule’s exceptions creates 
the understandable concern that matters of public interest will 
never see the light of day. District court judges within jurisdic-
tions that follow the exhaustive approach may not release grand 
jury records on their own. It is worth considering whether that 
outcome is socially desirable. 
The current exhaustive approach presumes that grand jury 
records that are not covered by an exception will remain secret 
forever.286 Perhaps this is correct. Secrecy, as has been shown 
above, is vitally important to the functioning of the grand jury. 
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Does our need for secrecy ever wane? The Second Circuit wrote 
that “[t]o the extent that the John Wilkes Booth or Aaron Burr 
conspiracies . . . led to grand jury investigations, historical inter-
est might by now overwhelm any continued need for secrecy.”287 
There is merit to this point, and, perhaps surprisingly, the gov-
ernment agrees.288 
Attorney General Eric Holder put forward a proposal to add 
a historical significance exception to the Rule in 2011,289 and the 
time has come for Congress and the Rules Committee to recon-
sider this position. The government took the position that 
Rule 6(e) is exhaustive and would therefore continue to presump-
tively bar attempts for release.290 But the government recognized 
that the public has a legitimate interest in learning about these 
significant proceedings.291 Holder therefore proposed that a his-
torical significance exception be created within the text of the 
Rule.292 
This proposal did not pass.293 Several of the opinions dismiss 
that decision as inconclusive evidence for either side,294 but it is 
worth considering what has changed since. The committee 
minutes show deference to legislative action, concern that this 
proposal would switch the default from secrecy to release, and 
skepticism that change would be premature.295 Only a couple of 
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district courts had dealt with the issue at the time, and the 
minutes explain that they resolved the issue through inherent 
power.296 Since then, that inherent power has been challenged. 
Because the Supreme Court has chosen to let the issue lie for now, 
Congress is the only remaining body with authority to change the 
Rule.297 
* * * 
More disclosures may be beneficial to the public interest and 
the integrity of the grand jury as an institution, but supervisory 
power is not the solution. As the Eleventh Circuit persuasively 
wrote, policy choices over when to allow disclosure are best left to 
Congress.298 Allowing courts to make these decisions at their dis-
cretion would “lay dangerous precedent for future judicial en-
croachment upon the role of the grand jury.”299 Witnesses, jurors, 
and even judges benefit from guidance on the rules of the grand 
jury. Inherent power “threatens to undermine the essential prin-
ciple that Rule 6(e) encompasses, within its four corners, the rule 
of grand-jury secrecy and all of its exceptions and limitations.”300 
As long as case-by-case discretion is on the table, those who play 
a role in the grand jury proceedings cannot be sure of what will 
be kept secret and what will be disclosed. If permitting disclosure 
is desirable for the benefit of the public, any rule authorizing such 
disclosure should be clearly defined and applied across the board. 
Given the historical independence of the grand jury from the 
control of both the executive and the judiciary, courts should 
abide by the exceptions within the Federal Rule. If disclosures 
outside the current exceptions promote the public interest, Con-
gress may consider revising the Rule.301 If Congress authorized 
such procedural changes, the Rule could be amended to accommo-
date the judicial desire for more disclosures.302 Until then, courts 
should interpret Rule 6(e) to be exhaustive. Academics and the 
general public may strongly desire more transparency in the 
workings of the grand jury, and this may in turn motivate Con-
gress to intervene. The Supreme Court, in forgoing the chance to 
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weigh in, has left it to the circuits and the Rules Committee to 
work through the issue.303 Though the goal of increased transpar-
ency around historically significant events is a valuable one, in-
dividual judicial discretion is the wrong approach. The Rules 
Committee may, through Congress, determine that the best 
course of action is to amend the Rules. Courts can expedite that 
process by denying any petitions that do not fall within the cur-
rent exceptions. 
CONCLUSION 
In disputes over historically significant records, the equities 
of the situation appear aligned with the permissive approach, 
which affords courts discretion over whether to release accounts 
of grand jury proceedings. Some of the grand jury proceedings oc-
curred decades before, the relevant parties may be deceased, and 
the public may benefit from learning the truth of high-profile his-
torical events. It is unsurprising that when asked to authorize 
disclosure, many judges find that the benefit of disclosure out-
weighs the continued need for secrecy in that case. Judges who 
find this a socially valuable end can rely on the Rule’s ambiguity 
and may interpret the lack of specific prohibition as permission 
to exercise supervisory power. 
But historical origins and principles of the grand jury, as well 
as overlooked Supreme Court precedent, weigh in favor of an ex-
haustive view of the Rule—one that limits courts’ discretion to 
only the exceptions explicitly listed in the Rule. If judges allow 
broad disclosure whenever a member of the public seeks access to 
interesting records, the result would vitiate the grand jury’s 
promise of secrecy that protects those accused in the past and fa-
cilitates the success of future investigations. 
Therefore, a solution to the interpretive problem must be con-
sistent with the interest in protecting the grand jury from en-
croaching judicial oversight while acknowledging how far the 
grand jury has veered since its inception. The text of the Rule can 
hold clues for both sides, and a decision that relies solely on tex-
tual analysis is ultimately unsatisfying and unpersuasive. 
The most sensible solution is to look beyond the text of the 
Rule and consider the positioning of the grand jury relative to the 
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judiciary—an institution “at arm’s length.” By understanding the 
institutional relationship, it becomes clear that judges have far 
less influence over the grand jury than they do over their own 
proceedings. Any supervisory power that the judiciary had over 
the grand jury was supplanted by the exceptions to the Rule. This 
conclusion is rooted in the history of the grand jury as a separate 
institution, the adoption of the Federal Rules as the guiding 
source for judges, and Supreme Court precedent that emphasizes 
the need for secrecy and independence in grand jury proceedings. 
Supervisory power is the wrong approach to a difficult ques-
tion, but that does not mean that the aim of the approach is un-
sound. If more disclosure is socially desirable because the public 
benefits from learning about previously unreported events, it 
should be left to Congress to revise the Rule. Discretionary deci-
sions by individual courts on a case-by-case basis not only exceed 
judicial authority and harm the independence of the grand jury, 
they also muddy the doctrinal landscape and create confusion for 
future courts. The Rules Committee and Congress ought to reex-
amine the Rule itself as well as the arguments for adding an ad-
ditional exception for extraordinary circumstances. Until then, 
courts should abide by the exceptions to the Rule and let Congress 
determine whether more judicial control over the modern grand 
jury is needed. 
